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Abstrat
Reputation and reommendation systems are funda-
mental for the formation of ommunity market plaes.
Yet, they are easy targets for attaks whih disturb
a market's equilibrium and are often based on heap
pseudonyms used to submit ratings. We present a
method to prie ratings using trusted omputing, based
on pseudonymous tikets.
1. Introdution
Market plaes for virtual goods are inreasingly o-
upied by self-organising ommunities. These market
plaes exhibit the harateristis of the so-alled long
tail eonomy. That is, the lassial asymmetry between
suppliers and onsumers is lifted. Buyers and sellers
are often even in numbers and may hange their roles
dynamially. Virtual, or physial, goods are oered in
large numbers and diversity and with potentially small
demand for eah single one. Mathmaking and orien-
tation of buyers is diult in a long tail eonomy, long
term relationships are hard to build, and trust between
trade partners must be established somehow [2℄.
A ommon approah is to let market players them-
selves provide the neessary guidane. This is mostly
embodied in reputation systems by whih buyers and
sellers rate eah other and the goods sold, or reom-
mendation systems, i.e., programs whih attempt to
predit items that a user may be interested in, given
some information about the user's prole. Reputation
systems, aording to Paul Resnik et al. [15℄ seek to
establish the shadow of the future [the expetation of
reiproity or retaliation in future interations, f. [1℄℄
to eah transation by reating an expetation that
other people will look bak on it. The goal is to es-
tablish a homogeneous market for honest partiipants.
That ommunity ratings (of goods) do in fat strongly
inuene buyer behaviour is shown empirially in [16℄.
Existing reputation systems are fragile, in that they
an easily be distorted or abused even within the frame
of laws governing them. `Attaks' of this kind, though
not proper attaks in the sense of information seu-
rity, threaten the integrity  with respet to its pur-
pose  of the informational ontent stored in the sys-
tem. Dellaroas [7℄ lssies unfair bahaviour into the
ategories 1. Ballot stung : A seller olludes with a
group of buyers in order to be given unfairly high rat-
ings. 2. Bad-mouthing : Sellers and buyers ollude to
rate other sellers unfairly low to drive them out of the
market. 3. Negative disrimination: Sellers provide
good servies only to a small, restrited group of buy-
ers. 4. Positive disrimination: Sellers provide exep-
tionally good servie to some buyers to improve their
ratings. A situation of ontrolled anonymity in whih
the market plae knows the identity of pariipants and
keeps trak of all transations and ratings, but oneals
the identity of buyers and sellers, is identied as essen-
tial to avoid unfair behaviour. For instane, anonymity
is an eetive protetion against bad-mouthing, but
annot work for ballot stung as sellers an give hid-
den indiations of their identities to olluders.
On the other hand, the best known individual at-
tak on reputation systems uses Sybils to obtain a
disproportionately large inuene [9℄. Friedman and
Resnik [10℄ point to the general problem of `heapness'
of pseudonyms in marketplaes and reputation sys-
tems, sine with name hanges dishonest players easily
shed negative reputation, as orroborated theoretially
in [8℄. The paper [3℄ gives an expliit threshold for the
transation osts for reputations needed to avoid ballot
stung. However, an indisriminate priing of identi-
ties for the submission of ratings poses an undesired
entry deterrent. It seems therefore plausible that rep-
utation systems should be based on pseudonyms whih
allow for a exible forward priing.
While related work addresses partiular vulnerabil-
ities [6℄, or proposes general frameworks to ensure a-
ountability in reputation systems, while maintaining
anonymity [4, 17℄, we here propose a simple mehanism
to introdue arbitrary osts for pseudonyms. The prin-
ipal approah is to use identities provided by trusted
omputing (TC) mehanisms for this purpose. The
next setion introdues the essentials of trusted om-
puting neessary to develop our onept. In Setion 3,
the entral onepts for arhitetures and protools for
aquisition and usage of TC-based identities in reputa-
tion systems is desribed. Setion 4 shows how this is
used in an integrated senario to prie reputations.
2. Trusted Computing essentials
TC aims at establishing trust in omputing plat-
forms. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has de-
ned a family of standards [12℄ to this end. A so alled
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is the trust anhor
oering the ability to seurely reate, store, and use
asymmetri keys. Moreover, a TPM in ooperation
with an appropriate operating environment an issue
to a third party assertions about the trustworthiness
of the omputing platform, e.g., signal that the plat-
form is in a seure state. Suh a TPM enhaned system
is alled trusted platform.
The TPM has so-alled shielded apabilities protet-
ing internal data strutures by ontrolling their use.
For the present appliation we use two partiular fea-
tures of a trusted platform. First, key reation and
management, and seond the ability to reate a trust
measurement whih an be used to assert a ertain
state toward a third party. The TPM is equipped with
a physial random number generator, and a key genera-
tion omponent whih reates RSA key pairs. The key
generator is designed as a proteted apability and the
reated private keys are kept in a shielded apability
(a proteted storage spae inside the TPM).
A ruial onept are the so alled attestation iden-
tity keys (AIK) whih are used to sign the trust mea-
surements or to ertify keys. AIKs an be used, a-
ording to TCG standards, to attest the origin and
authentiity of a trust measurement, but it an also
authentiate other keys generated by the TPM. The
latter funtionality is entral for our intended applia-
tion. Before an AIK an testify the authentiity of any
data, a Privay Certiation Authority (PCA) has to
issue a redential aknowledging that this AIK belongs
to a ertain TPM whih is deployed in a trusted plat-
form. The protool for issuing this redential onsists
in three basi steps. First, the TPM generates an RSA
key pair by performing the TPM_MakeIdentity om-
mand. The resulting publi key together with ertain
redentials identifying the platform is then transferred
to the PCA. Seond, the PCA veries the orretness
of the produed redentials and the AIK signature.
If they are valid the PCA reates the AIK redential
whih ontains an identity label, the AIK publi key,
and information about the TPM and the platform. A
speial struture ontaining the AIK redential is re-
ated whih is used in step three to ativate the AIK by
exeuting the TPM_AtivateIdentity ommand. So
far, the TCG-speied protool is not ompletely se-
ure, sine between steps two and three, some kind of
handshake between PCA and platform is missing. The
protool ould be enhaned by a hallenge/response
part to verify the link between the redentials oered
in step one and used in step two, and the issuing TPM.
3. Pseudonymous rating with AIKs
The basi idea is to establish a pseudonymous rat-
ing system using the identities embodied in the PCA-
ertied AIKs. We rst desribe how AIKs an be
turned into tikets that an be used in a reputation
system and then develop the proesses for their aqui-
sition and redemption.
3.1. AIKs as rating tickets
For seurity onsiderations the TPM restrits the us-
age of AIKs. It is not possible to use AIKs as signing
keys for arbitrary data and in partiular to establish
tikets in that way. It is therefore neessary to employ
an indiretion using a TPM generated signing key and
ertify this key by signing it with an AIK  viz er-
tify it in the parlane of the TCG. Creation of a key is
done by exeuting the TPM_CMK_CreateKey ommand,
whih returns an asymmetri key pair where the pri-
vate portion is enrypted by the TPM for use within
the TPM only. The resulting key pair is loaded into
the TPM by TPM_LoadKey and thereafter ertied by
TPM_CertifyKey. By ertifying a spei key the TPM
makes the statement that this key is held in a TPM-
shielded loation, and it will never be revealed. For
this statement to have veraity, a hallenger or verier
must trust the poliies used by the entity that issued
the identity and the maintenane poliy of the TPM
manufaturer.
This indiretion reates to eah AIK a ertied key
(by the namely AIK) that an be used for signing data,
in partiular the payload of a rating to be submitted to
a reputation system. We all this key pair the ertied
signing key (CSK). CSK, AIK, together with a erti-
ate by the PCA (see below) attesting the validity of
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Figure 1. Ticket acquisition process.
that AIK, are the ingredients that realise a tiket for
submission of a single rating.
3.2. Ticket acquisition and rating process
Rating tikets are aquired by a trusted agent (TA),
i.e., the user of a reputation system operating with
his trusted platform, from the PCA. They are then
redeemed at the reputation system (RS). In both, a
harging provider (CP) may our as a third party.
We now desribe how these operations proeed. Note
that we do not distinguish between publi and private
key portions of a ertiate establishing a redential.
As a notation, the redential of some ertied entity
Cert(entity, ertiate) means the union of the pub-
li key Pub(ertiate) and the entity signed with the
ertiate's private key, entity
Priv(ertiate). Verifying
a redential means to hek this digital signature.
The redentials issued by the PCA for a AIKs are
group redentials , i.e., they do not identify a single
AIK viz tiket but rather its prie or value group g
hosen from a predetermined set indexed by the nat-
ural numbers g ∈ {1, . . . , G}. The group replaes an
individual identity of a platform and many TAs will
get the same group ertiate. Only the PCA an po-
tentially resolve the individual identity of a platform.
These groups are used to implement prie and value
disrimination of ratings. Note that the PCA is free in
the hoie of methods to implement group ertiates.
This ould be done by simply using the same key pair
for the group or by the existing, sophistiated group
signature shemes [5℄.
If a TA wants to aquire a rating tiket from group g,
he rst generates an AIK using the TPM_MakeIdentity
r, Cert(r,CSK), Cert(CSK,AIK), Cert(AIK,g)
ACK
TA RS
generate CSK,
Cert(CSK,AIK),
Cert(r,CSK)
Verification,
authorisation
charging
via PCA
Figure 2. Ticket redemption process.
ommand. Next, TA requests from the PCA a reden-
tial for this AIK, belonging to group g, by sending AIK,
group identier and supplementary data as required by
TCG protools, to the PCA. The PCA now knows the
identity of the TA. This an be used to perform a harg-
ing for the tiket, either by ontating CP or by the
PCA itself (how harging atually works is not in the
sope of this paper). It is important that at this stage
an authorisation deision on the tiket generation an
be made by the PCA, for instane to blaklist misbe-
having partiipants. If the authorisation sueeds (and
not earlier to save bandwidth and resoures), the PCA
performs a handshake operation with the TA to ensure
that the AIK has atually been generated by the par-
tiular TPM in question. Upon suess, the PCA gen-
erates the redential Cert(AIK, g) ertifying that the
AIK belongs to group g. The redential is transferred
bak to TA, where nally the TPM_AtivateIdentity
ommand is exeuted to enable subsequent usage of
this AIK. The proess is shown in Figure 1.
Redeeming a rating tiket and submitting a rat-
ing r is now very simple. TA has rst to generate a
CSK, i.e., a publi/private key pair and the reden-
tial Cert(CSK,AIK) for it aording to the proess
desribed in Setion 3.1. He then signs r with CSK
to obtain Cert(r,CSK). The rating and the redential
hain Cert(r,CSK), Cert(CSK,AIK), Cert(AIK, g) is
then transferred from TA to RS. RS veries this hain
and makes an authorisation deision, for instane to
implement a protetion against multiple spending. Fi-
nally, RS aknowledges reeipt of r and optionally initi-
ates another harging operation (ex post harging) via
PCA.
3.3. Security and anonymity
The presented method for the management of
ratings in a reputation system provides for perfet
pseudonymity of the partiipants toward the system.
In fat, only PCA is able to de-anonymise users. This
3
implements preisely the ontrolled anonymity desired
for reputation systems. Note that for the namely rea-
son only PCA an initiate a harging, sine only he
knows (or is able to know) the identity of a TA and
an link it to the identity of the orresponding parti-
ipant.
To keep this pseudonymity strength, it is essential
that our onept relies only on genuine TPM funtion-
ality, and in partiular avoids the usage of trusted soft-
ware. If there was a trusted software managing rating
tikets in some way at the side of TA, then this soft-
ware, and the state of the platform would have to be
attested both in tiket aquisition and redemption. To
this end the TC protools for remote attestation trans-
fers trust measurements and measurement logs to the
orresponding verier (PCA or RS in our ase). These
data an however  and this is a prinipal problem
with remote attestation  be used to individualise the
trusted platform, if, as in the PC domain, the num-
ber of system states and dierent measurement logs
reated at boot time, is very large in relation to the
number of users of a TC-based servie. Besides, avoid-
ing remote attestation saves bandwidth and resoures
onsumption. Sine no trust an be laid in the TA
for rating tiket management, some kind of double, or
multiple, spending protetion or usage authorisation is
needed at RS upon tiket redemption.
4. Appliation senario
The embedding of the desribed tiket aquisition
and redemption into a (ommerial) reputation system
or another business ontext oers many variants. A
very basi senario is shown in Figure 3.
Here, a trusted agent (user) would like to express a
rating about another user (for example, a buyer about
a seller, a seller about a buyer), and would buy a rating
tiket from the PCA. The tiket belongs to a ertain
group whih an represent statements suh as for us-
age with RS XYZ (for example, eBay), and a ertain
rating level, e.g., an impat fator used by the RS to
alulate weighted overall ratings. The user then for-
mulates the rating and send it to the RS. The TA pays
for the tiket at the CP at the time of redemption of
the tiket and the CP distributes revenue shares be-
tween himself, PCA, and RS, aording to servie level
agreements. The result would be a rating statement
about another partiipant of the RS whih is trustwor-
thy, beause it is non-repudiatable by the signature
hain, aountable by resolution of the TA's identity
through PCA but proteted as a pseudonym by the
mehanism presented in this paper.
The PCA plays a very entral role for the ontrol of
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Figure 3. A reputation system with PCA.
identities embodied in the pseudonymous tikets that
it issues. It is in fat similar to the role of an identity
provider in identity management (IDM). That TC an
be used to model IDM was outlined in [13, 14℄, and
is exemplied in the present paper for the rst time.
Though the separation of duties between PCA and CP
allows in priniple even for anonymity of the person us-
ing a TA in the RS, sine only upon harging this per-
son must be identied by redit ard aount or other
means, this may not be the best option. One impor-
tant problem in reputation systems is aountability of
users, i.e., the possibility to trae bak maliious ones
and threaten them with personal onsequenes. While
RS may be able to obtain suh personal identities from
PCA in suh ases if pertinent ontratual relationships
are in plae, data protetion poliies or regulations may
prevent a CP from unveiling personal identities (if no
fraud or monetary damage is suspeted).
The seond role played by the PCA is for initiation
of harging for tikets and therefore for the intended
priing of ratings. With respet to the revenues from
rating tiket sales, a natural approah seems to be a
sharing between RS and PCA (and CP for its servie).
RS and PCA negotiate and implement poliies for au-
thorisation within the tiket aquisition and redemp-
tion proesses, e.g., to prevent double spending or to
blaklist misbehaving users. In ollaboration between
PCA and RS, pratially any priing sheme for rating
tikets an be realised. On the extreme ends of the
spetrum are ost-free registration of ratings by PCA,
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ensuring only aountability, and inreasing harges
with the number of ratings (or, e.g., their frequeny).
Even reverse harging, i.e., paying inentives for rat-
ings, e.g., suh of good quality, is possible.
5. Conlusions
Though envisaged with reputation systems as the
main motivation it is lear that the tiket aquisition
and redemption system above an be extended to a
generi pseudonymous tiket system for arbitrary ser-
vie aess or the aquisition of virtual goods. In
fat, what we have onstruted is essentially a pay-
ment system with a trusted third party guaranteeing
pseudonymity.
The presented sheme also extends to an arbitrary
number of reputation systems to whih the PCA oers
rating tiket priing as servies. A further extension
would be to let TA express values of tikets by using
dierent (groups of) CSKs. In this way ratings ould
be prioritised.
It is worthwhile to ompare our method with the
use ase senario Mobile payment of TCG's Mobile
Phone Working Group Use Case Senarios [11, Setion
8℄. There, the fous lies on devie-side support of pay-
ment operations on a mobile phone whih is turned
into a trusted platform. This always involves a trusted
software on the devie whih is not required in our ap-
proah. On the other hand this is only possible through
the introdution of a trusted third party, the PCA with
its extended duties. Thus we lak the universality of
lient-side solutions. Yet we have shown that a very
simple tiket system with strong pseudonymity an be
established resting solely on the most basi TPM fun-
tions.
6. Aknowledgements
The authors thank an anonymous referee for his on-
strutive omments.
Referenes
[1℄ R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basi
Books, New York, 1984.
[2℄ Y. Bakos. The emerging role of eletroni market-
plaes on the internet. Commun. ACM, 41(8):3542,
1998.
[3℄ R. Bhattaharjee and A. Goel. Avoiding ballot stu-
ing in ebay-like reputation systems. In P2PECON
'05: Proeeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM work-
shop on Eonomis of peer-to-peer systems, pages 133
137, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press.
[4℄ L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux. Aountable anony-
mous aess to servies in mobile ommuniation sys-
tems. In Proeedings of the 18th IEEE Symposium on
Reliable Distributed Systems, pages 384389, 1999.
[5℄ D. Chaum and E. van Heyst. Group signatures. In
D. Davies, editor, Advanes in Cryptology - EURO-
CRYPT '91, volume 547 of Leture Notes in Computer
Siene, pages 257265, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1991.
Springer-Verlag.
[6℄ A. Cheng and E. Friedman. Sybilproof reputa-
tion mehanisms. In P2PECON '05: Proeeding of
the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Eonomis
of peer-to-peer systems, pages 128132. ACM Press,
2005.
[7℄ C. Dellaroas. Immunizing online reputation reporting
systems against unfair ratings and disriminatory be-
havior. In ACM Conferene on Eletroni Commere,
pages 150157, 2000.
[8℄ C. Dellaroas. Santioning reputation mehanisms in
online trading environments with moral hazard. MIT
Sloan Working Paper No. 4297-03, 2004.
[9℄ J. R. Doueur. The sybil attak. In P. Drushel,
F. Kaashoek, and A. Rowstron, editors, Peer-to-Peer
Systems: First InternationalWorkshop, IPTPS 2002
Cambridge, MA, USA, Marh 7-8, 2002, volume 2429
of Leture Notes in Computer Siene, pages 251260.
Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[10℄ E. J. Friedman and P. Resnik. The soial ost of heap
pseudonyms. Journal of Eonomis & Management
Strategy, 10:173199, 2001.
[11℄ Trusted Computing Group. Mobile Phone Working
Group Use Case Senarios - v 2.7. Tehnial report,
TCG, 2005.
[12℄ Trusted Computing Group. TCG TPM speiation
version 1.2 revision 94. Tehnial report, TCG, 2006.
[13℄ N. Kuntze and A. U. Shmidt. Transitive trust in
mobile senarios. In G. Müller, editor, Proeedings of
the International Conferene on Emerging Trends in
Information and Communiation Seurity (ETRICS
2006), volume 3995 of Leture Notes in Computer Si-
ene (LNCS), pages 7385. Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[14℄ N. Kuntze and A. U. Shmidt. Trusted omput-
ing in mobile ation. In H. S. Venter, J. H. P.
Elo, L. Labushagne, and M. M. Elo, editors, Peer-
reviewed Proeedings of the ISSA 2006 From Insight
to Foresight Conferene. Information Seurity South
Afria (ISSA), 2006.
[15℄ P. Resnik, K. Kuwabara, R. Zekhauser, and E. Fried-
man. Reputation systems. Communiations of the
ACM, 43(12):45  48, 2000.
[16℄ M. J. Salganik, P. S. Dodds, and D. J. Watts. Exper-
imental study of inequality and unpreditability in an
artiial ultural market. Siene, 311(5762):854856,
2 2006.
[17℄ G. Zieglera, C. Farkas, and A. Lõrinz. A frame-
work for anonymous but aountable self-organizing
ommunities. Information and Software Tehnology,
48(8):726744, 8 2006.
5
